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Law as an Instrument of Social Control 
and 
Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction? 
Lon L. ~u l l e r*  
Do we use law as an instrument of constraint to keep people from evil 
or damaging behavior, or do we, through rules of law, provide for our 
citizens a framework within which they can organize their relations with 
one another in such a manner as to make possible a peaceful and profit- 
able coexistence? This question asks whether law, on the one hand, is 
assigned the purpose of achieving social control over the behavior of 
human beings; or whether, on the other hand, its function is to provide 
a means for facilitating human interaction. 
The aim of pitting these two quite distinct conceptions of the function 
of law against each other is not to pronounce which is "right." Neither 
is the purpose to dismiss the whole problem simply by accepting both as 
"right. " Each conception does present perfectly meaningful ways of per- 
ceiving what human beings attempt to accomplish through law. As we 
examine the different branches of law, we perceive that in one area one of 
these views of the function of law may be more apt and helpful than the 
other, though at times the two become so intertwined it is difficult to pull 
them apart. There are contexts in which they fit together so closely that 
they seem to merge; there are, on the other hand contexts in which they 
stand in sharp and meaningful contrast to one another. My objective 
here is to suggest some of the interrelations that may exist between the 
two ways of perceiving the function of the law. These interrelations run 
all the way from open conflict to an indispensable reciprocal reinforce- 
ment. 
The reciprocal reinforcement achieved by combining the two func- 
tions of law may perhaps best be illustrated by the related social phe- 
nomenon, language. Surely the primary function of language is to 
facilitate a particular kind of interaction, that involving a two-way com- 
munication of meaning. At the same time there are rules of grammar and 
of word-meaning that control linguistic behavior. We must respect those 
rules if we are to be understood at all. In a very real sense language sets 
us free by imposing limits on how we express what we intend to say. Both 
a dictionary and a grammar have a finite number of pages. At times in 
?Professor Fuller's essay was presented as a paper to the International Association for Philos- 
ophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Madrid, September 1973, and has been published in the 
Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. ARSP, Beiheft Neue Folge Nr. 8 (Franz 
Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1974). 
*Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence (Emeritus), Harvard Law School. 
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the history of language under the pressure of new conditions the rules of 
grammar and the existing limitations of vocabulary may undergo signifi- 
cant change. But a language that imposed no limitations at all on what is 
expressed or how something is said would be unable to function. Effec- 
tive communication depends upon orderly means of communication; 
order, of necessity, implies limits and an acceptance of constraints. 
The laws relating to murder and other forms of physical violence seem 
to fit very neatly the conception assigning to law the function of effecting 
a control over human behavior. On the surface of things, the rules con- 
cerning violence inflicted by one human being on another seem very 
remote from anything like a facilitation of human interaction. The man 
who sneaks up behind a fellow human being and plunges a knife into his 
back can scarcely be described as engaged in an interaction with his 
victim. The whole interactional perspective on law may seem, therefore, 
irrelevant to the rule prohibiting murder and acts of physical violence 
toward one's fellows. 
Yet, even in the law dealing with murder, situations can arise in which 
the interactional perspective becomes basic and essential. A threatens B 
with his fist and appears to be reaching for something in his pocket. B 
at once draws a revolver and kills A .  Charged with crime, B pleads that 
his act was done in self-defense. Situations of this sort are very difficult 
for the courts, both in securing reliable evidence as to just what happened 
and in judging the reasonableness of B's actions in the circumstances 
confronting him. Needless to say, these problems become aggravated 
when it is a policeman who does the killing and who pleads that he did 
what he had to do to protect himself or to prevent A from committing a 
serious crime. As in other interactional situations, we are here concerned 
with interpreting the meanings reciprocally conveyed by the behavior of 
men in interaction with one another. 
Again, a rule against murder, effectively enforced, serves to enlarge the 
scope of the individual's interactions with others. In many of our cities 
are areas that strangers cannot enter without some risk to their physical 
safety. Here a failure of legal control results in a restriction on inter- 
action, an interaction that in the long run might promote reciprocal 
understanding and, with it, a reduction in the risks that now aggravate 
distrust. 
Finally, it is worthy of note that in many societies the law against 
murder took its origin in a regulated and restricted interactional process. 
In a tribal society a member of Family A kills a member of Family B. 
This act, if unredressed, may lead to an all-out war between the two 
families. T o  forestall this disaster, many societies develcped a rule 
that Family B was entitled, as of right, to kill one member of Family A. 
Plainly this was a rule channeling and defining the limits of inter- 
action, though it served essentially the same general purpose as a criminal 
statute enacted by the state and imposing the death penalty on a person 
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found guilty of an unprovoked murder. 
The body of laws regulating traffic, including the rule that one passes 
the oncoming vehicle on the right, plainly serves the primary purpose of 
facilitating interaction. This it does by creating shared reciprocal expec- 
tations between motorists so that they may with confidence shape their 
conduct toward one another. 
In furtherance of this general goal of an ordered interaction, stop 
signs may be installed where a side road enters a main highway. Suppose 
that a motorist, driving at an early hour, where there is virtually no 
traffic on the streets, drives through a stop sign without coming to a full 
stop. He is arrested. In court the motorist defends himself by asserting 
that he looked carefully up and down the highway before crossing and 
that it was clear that there were no vehicles approaching from either 
direction. Coming to a full stop, under the circumstances, would have 
been pointless. Should the motorist be excused because his action 
harmed no one and, under the circumstances, could have harmed no one? 
In answer to this argument, we might suggest the case of a student in a 
course in literary composition who receives a failing grade on one paper 
because it contained a sentence written in atrocious grammar. The stu- 
dent insists that he has been unjustly treated because his sentence, 
though it departed from the usual rules of grammar, was perfectly intel- 
ligible. I doubt that this plea would be received with much favor by his 
teacher. And so it may be with our trespassing motorist. As with the 
student, we want the motorist to get into the habit of respecting the basic 
grammar of traffic, even in cases where disregarding that grammar will, 
under special circumstances, inflict no real damage on anyone. 
One of the functions of fixed rules of interaction - whether in traffic 
or in literary composition - is to relieve the actor of the burden, and 
the risks, involved in attempting to appraise the peculiar qualities of 
each separate situation in which he finds himself. What we call "rules of 
thumb" set us free to use our more flexible fingers in the solution of the 
more subtle kinds of tasks. 
The law of contracts, on its face, seems obviously aimed at producing 
a facilitation of interaction. When two parties have entered a contract, 
the terms of their legal relationship, their rights and duties toward one 
another, are to be found, not in law books, but in a document they have 
themselves drafted and agreed upon.' Yet adherents of the view that law 
consists essentially in an exercise of social control over human behavior 
may point out that the law of contracts itself of necessity contains a coer- 
cive element. If that law is to function effectively, the party who breaks 
the contract must, at the suit of his opposite number, be made to pay the 
'It is worth noting here that sometimes the very success of a contractual relation has the 
effect of supplanting i t  by something akin to a two-party customary law. Fuller, Human Znter- 
action and the Law, 14 AM. J .  JURISPRUDENCE 30 (1969). 
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price of his default by being ordered to perform his agreement or by 
being made to pay damages. So, it may be said, the law of contracts is, 
after all, an instrument of social control directed toward those who may 
be inclined to ignore their contractual obligations. 
Yet so easy a dismissal of the issues ignores the fact that the capacity to 
bind oneself legally is itself facilitative. The young man not yet old 
enough to enter a binding contract may find himself unable to buy goods 
on credit, something his older brother can do as a matter of course. Not 
uncommonly it is all on the same birthday that a young person will 
acquire the rights to vote, to bind himself by contract, and to operate an 
automobile. There is in this connection an interesting English word 
that derives from the French, though it is no longer in active use in the 
country of its origin. This is the verb to enfranchise. This word may 
mean, depending upon the context, to be freed from slavery, to acquire 
the right to vote, or to become vested with the capacity to bind oneself 
legally by a contractual arrangement. 
I have tried to show, in each of three areas of law, the importance of 
that perspective which sees law as also serving the function of facilitating 
human  interaction^.^ The rules concerning murder and violent assault, 
while apparently only effecting control over human behavior, do also in 
fact facilitate human interaction. The rules of traffic plainly serve the 
primary purpose of facilitating interaction, and contract law both facili- 
tates interaction and acts as an instrument of social control. While 
philosophers concerned with the general theory of law have given in- 
adequate attention to law's function of facilitating human interaction, 
this neglect has not caused any serious damage in the branches of law so 
far considered. In these areas judges and legislative draftsmen go about 
their business of performing what Karl Llewellyn used to call "the law 
job." They do what that job seems to require of them, without too much 
concern as to whether what they do coincides with the teachings of 
general legal theory. 
As we turn now to another branch, "customary law," we will find that 
it has suffered seriously from the conventional notion that law is essen- 
tially an instrument of "social control." "Customary law," as used here, 
does not include such things as food taboos, rules prohibiting acts of 
impiety toward supernatural beings, or traditional rules which define 
kinship with its rights and responsibilities. Rather, it refers to rules of 
conduct that arise directly out of the interaction of human beings, rules 
that enable men to anticipate the interactional behavior of their fellows 
in future encounters.3 The most obvious example of such a rule is the 
21 have also discussed the interactional foundations of enacted law in another context. Id. 
at 20-26. 
31 have tried to show the necessary interdependence of society-enacted law and the organiza- 
tional principles implicit in customary law in another article. Id. at 33-36. 
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one, already mentioned, by which one passes the oncoming vehicle on 
the right - a rule that existed in many societies long before it was incor- 
porated in statutory law. 
It is my contention that the phenomenon called "customary law" has 
been grossly neglected by writers on general legal theory and that, when 
they have given attention to it, they have generally shown little under- 
standing of its significance and have often grossly distorted the nature of 
the processes that give rise to it.4 One much-esteemed writer in the field 
of general legal theory has asserted, "Custom is not in the modern world 
a very important 'source' of law."5 I assert, on the contrary, that 
custom - in the sense of a pattern of reciprocal expectations arising out 
of past interactions - is not only an important direct source of law in 
modem society, but that our conceptions and misconceptions of it 
silently shape in many ways our attitudes toward the meaning of enacted 
law. 
Certainly one cannot dismiss the field of commercial law as being 
unimportant in the present world. In this field the significance of cus- 
tom - in the sense of stabilized expectancies that arise from past inter- 
actions - receives explicit recognition in the Uniform Commercial 
Code. This code speaks of "a usage of trade" as "any practice or method 
of dealing having such regularity of observance . . . as to justify an expec- 
tation that it will be observed" in the f ~ t u r e . ~  The  code recognizes, in 
other words, that patterns of interaction may crystallize into firm expec- 
tations having the force of law. The  code also recognizes something that 
might be called two-party customary law. In this case, instead of speaking 
of a "usage of trade," the code speaks of "a course of dealing" which it 
describes as "a sequence of previous conduct between the parties. . . 
which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of under- 
standing for interpreting their expressions and other conduct. "7 
It is interesting to observe that the descriptions of customary law con- 
tained in the Uniform Commercial Code can be applied without 
inter- qualification to quite a different area of human interaction, i.e., ' 
national law. In the course of repeated interactions between or among 
nations, discernible patterns may emerge. When the expectations 
generated by these patterned interactions have become sufficiently 
crystallized, they may enter into and become integral parts of what is 
generally accepted as international law. 
The reason that legal theorists have difficulty in dealing with custom- 
ary law derives from the fact that it does not emanate from some identifi- 
able center of authority. The participants in the interactions that give 
4For a comparison of the conflicting anthropological views of Malinowski and Gluckman as 
to the nature of customary law see id. at 31 -33. 
5H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 44 (1961). 
 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 9 1 -ZO5(Z). 
'UNIFORM COMMERC~AL CODE 5 1 -205(1). 
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rise to customary law do not consult the books to see how they should 
conduct themselves toward one another; they shape their conduct by the 
patterns that have arisen tacitly out of their past dealings with one an- 
other or that they discern in the interactions of others engaged in trans- 
actions similar to those in which they are themselves involved. 
So, we have to say of customary law not simply that it serves to facilitate 
interaction, but that it derives tacitly from interaction. This makes it a 
subject difficult to reconcile with the usual presuppositions underlying 
general theories of law. These theories, whatever their differences in 
matters of detail, seem all to share the view that law is a species of control 
imposed from above; it derives from, and is dependent upon, some estab- 
lished center of authority. The notion that human subjects of law can, 
through their interactions, generate rules of law is something that legal 
theory has never felt comfortable with. The result has been that custom- 
ary law remains for legal theorists an anomaly and is generally passed over 
as quickly and quietly as possible, often being dismissed with an obser- 
vation, such as that already quoted, that is has ceased to play any im- 
portant role in modern social systems. 
In confronting the dilemma presented by customary law, sociologists 
have proved themselves somewhat less timid and perplexed than their 
counterparts among legal theorists. This difference comes about, I 
believe, because sociologists, in comparison with legal philosophers, 
have a greater tolerance for broad metaphorical explanations of social 
phenomena. When sociologists are asked, "Whence comes the sense of 
compulsion that lies behind customary law?" some of them, at least, have 
an answer that lies in some such concept as Durkheim's collective con- 
sciousness.8 The compulsions imposed by customary law are not, accord- 
ing to this view, anomalous or radically different from those imposed by 
statutes; they possess, indeed, the same kind of compulsive force as en- 
acted laws. The only difference is that in one case the compulsive force 
is derived from explicit enactment by a legislative body charged with 
making law; in the other it represents a tacit expression of the will of 
society. 
A passage from a recent French treatise on the sociology of law suggests 
the need for attention to social processes that may produce law. The 
following translation of the original is my own. 
From what source does the law derive? For sociological theory. . . that 
question permits of only one answer. . . the law derives from the social 
group; legal rules express the way in which the group considers that 
social relations ought to be ordered. This point of view is quite different 
from that generally taught. The current doctrine . . . does not bring to 
clear articulation the question of the origin of the force of law generally, 
though that question is basic and fundamental. Instead the current doc- 
8For a discussion of Durkheim's concept see Catlin, Znt~oduction to E. DURKHEIM, THE 
RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD at xiv (Solovay 8c Mueller transl. 1938). 
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trine applies its efforts to the different modalities in which the law 
appears (legislation, custom, judicial decisions, expert opinion), thus 
giving the impression that these modalities are radically different from 
one another. On the contrary, from a sociological point of view, these 
formal sources of law, which the jurists are concerned to distinguish, are 
simply different varieties of one single and unique source: the will of the 
social group. . . . Statutory law is not essentially different from custom: 
both are the expressions of the will of the group.9 
I do not offer this rather startling quotation to imply that sociologists 
generally would find it acceptable as an explanation for the origin and 
binding force of "customary law. " I t  can, however, serve to remind both 
sociologists and legal theorists that they need to give more attention than 
they have in the past to the social processes from which rules can emerge 
and become effective as law without receiving the imprimatur of any 
explicitly legislative organ of government. As previously suggested, this 
law definitely cannot be dismissed as being largely an attribute of primi- 
tive preliterate societies and retaining only a marginal significance in 
modern society. 
In reality, a modern system of written statutory law depends for its 
successful functioning on what may be called a form of customary law, 
in the sense of a system of stabilized interactional expectancies.10 
Statutes are put into textual form by legislatures; their meaning and 
application to specific situations of fact are authoritatively determined 
by the judiciary. When a legislator drafts a statute, he takes into ac- 
count, tacitly or explicitly, the established attitudes that courts have dis- 
played toward the task of interpreting legislative enactments. If the 
courts have displayed a clear tendency toward a strict and literal interpre- 
tation, the legislative draftsman will take this judicial inclination into 
account in wording his enactment. A sudden shift by the judiciary toward 
a looser standard of interpretation may be disruptive and can work 
serious injustice to those who have viewed the meaning of the statute in 
the light of past judicial practice. 
In the same way much of the living law of judicial procedure is to be 
found, not in printed paragraphs contained in statute books, but in the 
continuing patterns of interaction that have developed between judges 
and the advocates who appear before them in the actual process of trial. 
T o  understand what is going on in a trial, one has to be initiated into the 
"law" that governs the conduct of the trial and assigns to judge and advo- 
cate their respective roles. That "law" lies partly in the established pat- 
terns and reciprocal expectations that give sense and direction to the 
9L. LEVY-BRUHL, SOCIOLOGIE DU DROIT 3 9 4 0  (1964). 
1°It is a curious fact that rules need be both generally expressed and followed by the govern- 
ment in order that the legal system may function. A persistent disregard of the rules can under- 
mine the moral foundation of a legal order, both for those subject to it and for those who 
administer it. For a discussio? of my position on the internal morality of law see Nicholson, 
The Internal Morality of l a w :  Fuller and His Critics, 84 ETHICS 307 (1974). 
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whole process of trial. 
Finally, I suggest that the study of customary law, in its multiform 
varieties, has been handicapped by the circumstance that many of its 
rules - including the most central and significant - are often tacit and 
do not come to clear articulate expression until they have been violated 
or ignored. In his Geist des romischen Rechtsl1 Rudolph von Jhering 
speaks of "latent" rules. He then asks how a rule can be "latent." Rules 
are injunctions that are obeyed or observed; how can one observe a rule 
that remains tacit and unverbalized? Jhering's answer is to invoke the 
analogy of language. He reminds us that rules of grammar often first 
come to articulation when they have been conspicuously violated. So it 
is with the basic grammar of law and of human interaction generally. 
The  tacit or latent quality of the anticipations that grow out of human 
interactions has tended to remove from the concerns of legal scholarship 
an analysis of the manner in which these tacit anticipations shape and 
govern the ongoing processes of a functioning society. It is in part 
through these tacit anticipations that accompany and shape it that law can 
become - in a meaningful sense - an instrument for facilitating 
human interaction. 
1 1 1  R. VON JHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEX RECHTS 29-30 (8th ed. 1 9 2 4 ) .  
